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The Transatlantic Political Economy
French « Interests » and the Debate Over the US Debt, 1787‑1795
Allan Potofsky
1 The question of mutual “disillusionment” between the actors of the French and American
Revolution is the subject of a long historiographical tradition (Palmer, Echeverria, Dunn).
In  studies  of  Federalist  America,  the  events  and  ideologies  that  transformed  the
pro‑French revolutionary camp of the young republic—newspapers such as the Aurora of
Philadelphia and the Boston Centinel, publications of Democratic‑Republican clubs, and
eminent pro‑French crusaders such as John Daly Burk and the editor Benjamin Franklin
Bache—into a spent force after the “Quasi‑War” of 1798 have led historians to focus on
the primacy of political factors. The political circumstances that alienated a good part of
American public opinion from the French Revolution are well documented, from Citizen
Genêt’s arrival in Charleston in April 1793 with the objective of agitating the francophone
peoples of  Florida,  Louisiana and Canada to take arms against Spain and Britain and
through  the  French  Directoire’s  attacks  on  American  shipping  during  the  Adams
administration  at  the  end  of  the  revolutionary  decade.  Apart  from these  diplomatic
incidents that highlighted deep political differences, the “divorce” between the American
and French republics is  also explained by historians of  religion,  and in particular,  of
evangelical Protestantism, as the exhaustion of fervent and millenarian “gallomania.”
(Elkins & McKitrick 8: 303‑373; Bloch)
2 From  the  French  perspective,  the  issue  of  the  disillusionment  of  the  previously
pro‑American Lumières is interpreted as primarily a political question. The émigrés and
refugees that arrived from French port towns and the Caribbean basin were quick to
denounce the unenlightened state of  public  opinion in America,  in particular,  in the
memoirs written following their abrupt departures under the menace of the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798. Their critical positions toward the United States were often colored
by their rough treatment under the distinctly pro‑British Federalist policies of the Adams
administration. Moreover, the constitutional debate that inspired a French critique of
Anglo‑American bicameralism, as opposed to the undivided unicameral legislature, was
stressed by Durand Echeverria almost fifty years ago and before him, by Bernard Fay, in
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the 1920s. In sum, political differences were principally responsible for the drift apart of
the two “sister republics.” (Potofsky, Echeverria, Fay, Higonnet)
3 The focus of this essay is not that of political disenchantment nor millenarian fatigue but,
rather, the debate on Atlantic commerce. In the years following American independence
and the beginning of the French Revolution, the French Lumières, deeply influenced by
the  physiocratic  political  economy,  expressed  hope  that  new  principles  of  political
economy would transform commercial relations in a changed Atlantic trading world. In
the physiocratic categories of the 1770s and early 1780s, the “regenerated” French and
American nations, freed from “feudal” forms of tyranny while maintaining agricultural
economies,  would  establish  commercial  ties  based  on  the  classic  narrative  of  “doux
commerce": the evolution of the two civilizations would mutually drive them into stages
of history into where liberty and material progress developed together. This physiocratic
optimism, moreover, was grounded in a “negative” critique of mercantilism and colonial
adventures rather than on a “positive” idea of the supposed unity of the Atlantic world.
(Cheney 232‑3, Dziembowski 258‑260, Spengler 252‑263) But physiocratic confidence in
progress would ultimately fade in the face of the challenges of the years leading up to the
French Revolution. As will be demonstrated in this paper, the end of theoretical Atlantic
commercial solidarities led to a turbulent period of diplomatic crises in the 1790s. A study
of the writings of the French Atlantic commercial specialist,  G‑J‑A Ducher (174?‑1796)
illustrates that the categories of Atlantic commerce were transformed into a source of
international tension  around  the  particular  “deficit‑consciousness”  of  French
revolutionaries who, even before the summer of 1789, were convinced that, rather than
embodying commercial opportunity, the American republic had come to represent, quite
literally, a liability to France.
4 In  the  period  following  the  defeat  of  France  in  the  Seven  Years’  War,  a  form  of
Enlightenment  discourse  would  increasingly  take  up  the  very  mundane  question  of
commerce between France and the  New World.  America  and then the United States
served as  a  pretext  for  a  larger  discussion of  the  benefits  of  an  exchange  that  was
attentive to the elevation of the mœurs and culture of the parties involved. To assure this,
state‑centered  economic  control  would  direct  international  commercial  relations.
Emerging from the debate of America’s place in the political economy of France is a fairly
clear  consensus  about  international  commerce:  the  laws  of  supply  and  demand,  the
origins of wages and prices, much discussed by the Physiocrats, or the problem of balance
of trade so dear to the Mercantilists, were secondary to the concern with a state‑driven “
doux commerce.” Thus, the civilizing and progressive qualities of commerce were entirely
compatible with la thèse royale,  with the idea that the visible hand of the state could
intervene in the market place without distorting the rules of trade. (Hirschman 96‑99)
5 But underlying the debates on commerce between France and America in the 1770s was a
largely  geo‑political  question.  Opposing  the  development  of  any  real  current  of
Enlightenment  cosmopolitanism,  the  diplomatic  strategies  of  France  toward  America
focused on the mercantilist struggle against England and Spain. (Dziembowski 263‑276)
Even the French Revolution was never freed of  the geo‑political  aspirations of,  most
notably, Turgot and Vergennes, who had argued in the 1770s that the commercial interest
of  France  was  served  by  the  persistence  of  anglophobia  that  guided  the  Americans
through the War of Independence. Hence, the Ministre des Affaires étrangères Vergennes
founded the newspaper, Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique (1776‑9) as a propaganda
organ against the British during the revolutionary war (Hardman & Price 277‑283). And as
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Benjamin  Franklin  had  been  quick  to  exploit  as  an  unofficial  ambassador  in  Paris
(1776‑1785) and in his negotiations with Vergennes, the French Empire would come to the
aid of America thanks in part to a francophile image that promised closer ties between
France and the United States in opposition to Great Britain.
6 Following  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  September  1783  that  put  an  end  to  the  War  of
Independence,  a  more  cosmopolitan  discourse  prevailed  in  the  discussion  over
Franco‑American  political  economy.  This  was  the  period  where  networks  of  reading
societies  and clubs,  publishing circles  and subscribers,  of  academies  and loosely‑knit
political associations, brought the literati of the French and American Enlightenment into
increasing contact with one another, creating fraternities,  intellectual exchanges, and
even material debts and obligations that were in many ways as vital as the academic
debates  between Lumières.  These  seemed to  have  created  a  real  impetus  for  a  more
rigorous science of political economy concerning exchanges between the Old and New
Worlds.  As  Condorcet  boldly  predicted in De l’influence  de  la  Révolution  d’Amérique  sur
l’Europe (1786), the time had come to wean the French Lumières away from Montesquieu’s
anglophilia in order to construct a political model closer to that of the federalism of the
United States.
7 By the 1780s, the engagement of France in the War of Independence had created fertile
grounds for another context for the debate over French commerce in the United States.
This discourse about French commerce was also made concrete in the years leading up to
the French Revolution in the form of  the project  of  Brissot  de Warville  and Etienne
Clavière,  the  founders  of  the  Société  gallo‑américaine,  whose  charter  of  January  1787,
explicitely  sought  to  draw  up  “un  traité  de  commerce  fondé  sur  l’intérêt  des  deux
nations.” (Brissot 15‑17) Their short‑lived project to make the two nations privileged
partners was ultimately cut short by the convocation of the Etats‑Généraux the following
year. The engagement of Brissot and Clavière as well as Roland, Lanthenas and other
future Girondin in the events of Paris, collided with the outbreak of the Revolution in Paris
in the summer of 1789. Previously, in May 1788, Brissot had travelled to the United States
to invest in land in several states using the money of private companies, all the while
using his political connections to meet with the leaders of the young republic (McCoy
109‑110, Brissot et Clavière).
8 The economic analysis of the United States in the charter of the Société gallo‑américaine
holds closely to a standard physiocratic line, echoed in many ways by Jefferson, about the
superiority of agriculture over manufactures.
Le travail de la campagne offre plus de moyens à deux individus, de vivre ensemble,
d’augmenter,  de soutenir leur famille,  que le travail  des manufactures;  car dans
celles‑ci  la  dépendance  de  l’ouvrier,  son  état  précaire  &  variable,  son  salaire
modique, & le prix incertain des denrées des villes, où sont établies presque toutes
les manufactures, le mettent hors d’état de songer à avoir une compagne, &, s’il en
a une, la perspective de la misère qui doit la suivre après sa mort, lui fait une loi de
la rendre stérile. (Brissot & Clavière 56)
9 In  a  phrase  that  might  have  been  lifted  directly  from Jefferson’s  Notes,  the  authors
conclude: “Ce contraste seul doit décider les Américains libres à renoncer à l’état pénible
de manufacturier” (57).
10 From this argument, it is unsurprising that Brissot sought to focus his energies in real
estate adventures; it is also unsurprising that one sees in this quotation the influence of
Brissot’s  collaborator  and  friend,  Saint‑Jean  de  Crèvecoeur  whose  Letters had  been
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translated in Paris in 1784 and who was also one of the “American” members of the Société
gallo‑américaine.
11 It is difficult not to anticipate the thesis of continuity, between Brissot and Clavière’s
charter, and through the revolutionary years, in particular, in the words and actions of
the members of the Société de 1789, the Cercle social, La Société des Amis des Noirs, and other
clubs with an openly “Americanist” tilt in its membership until the Year II and the Terror.
But the dream of the founders of the Société gallo‑américaine was never to reach fruition.
For the context surrounding the events not of the summer of 1789, as might be expected,
but  rather  the spring of  1787 represented the moment  of  the transformation in the
discourse of political economy concerning the United States. Hereafter, the possibilities
of constructing privileged commercial ties between France and America, as will be argued
below, would confront many obstacles. (Appleby, Higonnet, Dunn)
12 On 2 March, 1787, a mere two months after the Société gallo‑américaine was founded, the
contrôleur général des finances Charles Alexandre de Calonne, announced to the assembly of
notables the desperate state of French financing and the staggering amount of the French
public deficit. By publishing the precise numbers at the end of the month, Calonne sought
to bring before the court of public opinion the urgent need to reform the state and to
increase tax revenues across the realm. As contemporary historians have noted, in the
clearer light of historical review, the “catastrophic” nature of the French deficit at the
end of the Ancien Régime was relative.  For the budget crisis  was in fact far from the
deepest known to Europe. By 1783, the British Crown’s debt reached 66% of total tax
revenue;  as Michel  Morineau has demonstrated;  this was proportionately much more
than the 100 million‑livre debt of the French state in 1787. But in perception if not in
reality, the question of the deficit had deep implications for the national sovereignty of
the competing powers of this period (Brewer 114‑116; Morineau 320).
13 The  French  state’s  deficit  had  deep  ramifications  with  defense,  administration,  and
confidence in the security of the national wealth; it also inspired a debate that opened an
unexpected kind of opportunity for those determined to reform the system that created
the deficit. For with the reform of the finances would necessarily emerge the project of
reforming  society  as  a  whole.  In  particular,  the  French  debt  exposed  the  structural
weaknesses of a fiscal system based on a complex network of privileges and corporate
bodies that supplied low‑cost credit to the state. The depth of the problems posed by the
deficit reached into the very foundations of Ancien Régime society, with its layers of venal
offices and corporate privileges that had become transformed into complex systems of
public  finance.  The  more  the  Crown created  guild  monopolies,  or  “métier  jurés,”  for
example,  the  greater  its  share  in  the  contributions  of  master  artisans  towards  the
national coffers (Sonenscher I: 65‑67).
14 In terms of the larger scandal unleashed by the near bankruptcy of the French state, the
question of the American debt to France stemming from the War of Independence would
have a relatively minor role. Yet, hardly a discussion about commerce with the young
American republic  over  the next  decade would take place without  a  mention of  the
enormous debt that the United States owed to France. The contested figure of $5.6 million
was widely circulated,  and it  formed the basis  of  much that  was written during the
Revolution about the United States. In sum, the question of this deficit would haunt every
new effort to reforge relations between the two republics.  Among other complexities
arising from the desperate French attempts to see the American debt liquidated were the
efforts of the new Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, to make regular payments to
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France starting in 1790. The following year, Jefferson arranged that money be transferred
to the first French ambassador of the Revolution, Jean‑Baptiste Ternant, appointed in
August  1791.  From  the  French  perspective,  however,  speed  was  of  the  essence,  in
particular, after the declaration of war against Austria, Holland, Spain, and Prussia in the
spring and summer of 1792; by contrast,  for the Americans, a systematic and regular
reimbursement was privileged in respecting the letter of the Treaty of 1778. After the
declaration  of  neutrality  by  Washington  in  April  1793,  however,  the  American
government largely deferred these payments perceived as potential partisan assistance to
a belligerent party (Sloan; Elkins & McKitrick 332‑334).
15 The urgency to receive American repayment nourished a notion that the intervention of
France in the War of Independence had ruined the French state. This idea circulated far
and wide in the early years of the French Revolution. Among royalist circles, for example,
it became a fairly widely shared opinion. The desperate state of French finances led Louis
XVI in 1792 to comment to the Minister of the Navy, Bertrand de Molleville, that the
French money spent in America’s War of Independence had led directly to the collapse of
the monarchy. In 1792, the king virulently opposed a project to intervene in British India,
because it reminded him of “l’affaire de l’Amérique à laquelle je ne pense jamais sans
regret. On a un peu abusé de ma jeunesse dans ce temps‑là ; nous en portons la peine
aujourd’hui.  La  leçon  est  trop  forte  pour  l’oublier”  (correspondence  reprinted  in
Hardman & Price 43).
16 Diplomatic relations between the two revolutionary nations were affected by the debt.
The  American  diplomat  who  replaced  Jefferson  in  Paris,  Gouvernor  Morris,  kept
extensive journals from 1789‑92 where he spoke of the many attempts launched at first
by the popular controller‑général, Necker, to renegotiate the debt owed to France through
massive importation of products of the United States. Morris also noted that the royalists
and the Girondins were united in this focus upon the American debt.  After the fall  of
Necker,  Morris  complained  bitterly  of  the  efforts  of  the  former  americanophile
co‑founder of the Société gallo‑américaine, Etienne Clavière, who had become the Ministre
des finances in the Girondin government of March 1792, to obtain payment of the debt. In
the midst of slave rebellions in the colonies, Clavière insisted that the American diplomat
arrange  the  payment  of  $400,000  to  be  given  immediately  to  the  consulate  of
Saint‑Domingue for the relief of besieged colonists. This request was refused by Morris;
he claimed in his journal that he pretended not to understand what had been proposed
(Davenport I: 506‑508).
17 The liquidation and reimbursement of the American debt was also an integral part of the
central project of Morris’ French counterpart, the Citoyen Genêt in his “mission” to the
United States of 1793. Genêt, in fact, owed his nomination partially to the reputation of
Observations sur la liquidation et le remboursement de la dette Américaine of 1791, in which he
outlined a strategy for re‑negotiating the terms of the 1778 Franco‑American treaty in
order  to  obtain a  quick  liquidation  of  the  debt.  By  April  1793,  upon  his  arrival  in
Charleston, Genêt’s project for reimbursement had become magnified into spectacular
proportions.  The  money  was  henceforth  to  fund  the  totality  of  France’s  diplomatic
missions, colonies, and military expenditures in the New World. The United States would
directly funnel  resources to Genêt who would then disburse them as needed and,  in
particular, would subsidize his secret activities to provoke anti‑British and anti‑Spanish
uprising in Louisiana, Florida, and Canada (Rossignol 91‑96).
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18 A Franco‑American commercial debate that broke out in the late 1780s helped undermine
the earlier,  optimistic discourse of Atlantic political economy and deeply affected the
public consciousness of the French deficit by creating the myth of the American debt as
helping to ruin the Ancien‑Régime French state. The example of a polemic between the
Girondin Minister Clavière and an obscure commercial specialist who became a vital figure
in the forging of commercial policy toward the United States brings to light the contours
and  the  implications  of  this  debate.  As  we  will  see,  the  very  possibilities  of  a
pro‑American  lobby  in  France  were  undermined  by  the  virulent  and  continuous
condemnation  of  an  American  delay  in  debt  payment,  which  was  seen  as  tainting
transatlantic relations. In the period of the Terror, moreover, the debt was ever more
closely associated with corruption, as will be illustrated in the case of Clavière. Of course,
the  veracity  of  the  charge of  corruption in  the  French Revolution was  no longer  of
substantive importance; it was a form of denunciation to attack one’s political enemies.
Yet, in the case of Franco‑American commercial ties,  the discourse of commerce as a
progressive and enlightening act of exchange between nations was the first casualty of
harsh vigilance against cases of corruption, most particularly, after the enactment of the
Maximum Laws on 4 May and 29 September 1793, featuring the strict control of wages
and prices. In this context, the end of Atlantic solidarity between the “sister republics”
was  inscribed  in  a  combination  of  domestic  political  rivalry,  a  deeply  politicized
misunderstanding of the role of the debt, and the desperate circumstances of France at
war.
19 J‑G‑A Ducher, a barrister in the Paris Parlement under the Ancien Régime, was a specialist
in  commercial  affairs  who  played  an  active  role  in  carving  out  the  maritime  and
mercantile policy of France in the Revolution. He was posted in the French consulates of
New York, New Hampshire and North Carolina during the period 1783 to 1790. When
Ducher  returned  to  France  in  1790,  he  published  no  less  than  seven brochures  and
memoirs on the commercial practices and the maritime and trading laws of the United
States. He was an active collaborator of the Moniteur during 1792 and would be one of the
principal authors of the Acte de Navigation of March, 1793 securing monopolistic rights for
the nation over the colonies; finally, in his most influential position, Ducher served as a
member of  the Bureau Diplomatique et  Commercial  de  la  Commission des  Douanes for  the
Convention from May 1793 until his death in 1796. (D’Amat & Limouzin‑Lamothe 1230;
Nussbaum)
20 Ducher was a partisan of the Montagnards, and was deeply opposed to the policies of the
Girondin Clavière on many fiscal and economic issues. Above all, Ducher’s principal casus
belli was Clavière’s plan to make the assignats France’s national currency. Of course, in the
period of the Year II, policy debates were framed in terms of ad hominem attacks on the
“factional”  interests  of  one’s  opponents,  not  in  terms  of  the  substantive  issues  of
lawmaking.
21 Most infamously,  Ducher’s attack on Clavière in August 1793 accused the Ministre des
finances of corruption in the form of tampering with Genêt’s mission to the United States.
In a detailed and elaborate plot, rendered by Ducher down to the most obscure detail,
Clavière  was  accused  of  using  an  English  banker  to  recover  a  partial  American
reimbursement,  secretly  worked  out  by  Genêt  with  American  authorities.  This
Englishman, in the role of a “third man,” was accused of siphoning off a percentage of the
money, using Dutch banks for its blanchissement for the private gain of Clavière. “Jusqu’à
quand,” he wrote, in a phrase whose anti‑semitism must have rung hollow in the Jacobin
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environment of the Terreur, “la France sera‑t‑elle traitée par les banques & commerces de
Londres  & Amsterdam,  comme un mineur  l’est  par  un  Juif?”  Ducher’s  accusation of
corruption stuck to Clavière, for it became a part of the litany of charges against the
Girondin who would commit suicide in prison in December 1793 (Ducher 1793:  14‑15;
Clavière 1793: 9‑10; Bénétruy).
22 Ducher’s long‑term project had been to create a privileged pole of exchange between the
two republics. For the occasion of the founding of the French Republic in September 1792,
Ducher wrote of the need to create,  as he entitled his brochure,  a Nouvelle  Alliance à
Proposer Entre les Républiques Française et Américaine. Here, he draws the conclusion that a
pact between France and the United States should resemble that between the thirteen
states of the union: 
La nouvelle constitution générale des Etats‑Unis garantit à chaque Etat de l’union
une  forme  républicaine  de  gouvernement,  &  protection  contre  toute invasion
étrangère & insurrection intérieure Si  les républiques française & américaine se
jurent solennellement une semblable garantie, tous les tyrans seront anéantis (4). 
23 The importance of the regeneration of the two nations through commercial ties was the
central  argument  put  forth by  Ducher  in  this  classic  and wholly  banal  statement  of
Enlightenment commercial cosmopolitanism of 1792: 
Les Etats‑Unis doivent donc être liés commercialement avec la France, plus qu’avec
aucune autre nation. Les plus grands, les plus chers, intérêts doivent déterminer les
deux républiques à former entre elles un pacte national pour se garantir territoire,
indépendance, républicanisme & commerce (6). 
24 In  sum,  Ducher  never  wavered  in  his  commitment  to  forge  closer  commercial  ties
between the two “sister republics."
25 However,  war and terror would turn Ducher’s attention increasingly away from such
cosmopolitan pronouncements and toward the American debt to France, in particular
after George Washington’s proclamation of neutrality in April 1793. This growing debt
consciousness was revealed in his titles: “De la dette publique en France, en Angleterre,
dans les Etats‑Unis de l’Amérique” or, more starkly “La France, créancière des Etats‑Unis
d’Amérique.” In the latter text, published in the summer of 1793, Ducher calculates to a
precise degree of exactitude what each individual American state could contribute to
effacing the growing debt to France,  with South Carolina,  having potentially profited
from the arrival of hundreds of destitute Creole planters fleeing the slave rebellions of
Saint‑Domingue,  owing the  deepest  debt  to  France.  In  his  utterly  illusory  project  to
recover the debt from the United States, each state would be obliged to participate by
paying in kind,  chiefly  in agricultural  products,  and according to  its  population and
percentage of American production; in return monopolistic Navigation Acts would be
passed  between the  two republics  that  would  create  a  narrow corridor  of  exchange
between France and her colonies and the United States,  at the exclusion of all  other
European nations. “L’extinction de la Dette fera le bonheur de la France, politiquement et
commercialement” (Ducher 1793: 11).
26 Of course, the end of Transatlantic solidarities, as expressed above, purely based on the
ideals  of  “indépendance,  républicanisme  &  commerce”  between  the  two  nations,
mirrored the growing desperation of the French state, faced with war and the prospect of
repeated crises in its financing. As the question of the American debt became assimilated
in its urgency to that of France’s own, and, as the solutions to France’s own deficit would
remain  tenuous  at  best,  the  discourse  of  political  economy  regarding  a  world  of
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republican commerce between the free citizens on the two sides of the Atlantic took a
dark  turn,  and  became  exclusively  focused  on  the  financial  question,  often  at  the
exclusion of all other issues.
27 In conclusion,  we return,  briefly,  to the former américaniste,  Clavière,  in a riposte to
Ducher’s  massive  projects  for  Franco‑American  Navigation  Acts  in  exchange  for  the
immediate  reimbursement  of  the  debt.  In  an  attempt  to  defend  himself  against  the
charges of corruption, Clavière published a brochure in the summer of 1793, just after his
fall from the Ministry of Finance and publication of the decree of 2 June that ordered him
put under house arrest. It was not only a plea for his life, but also was a condemnation of
the mercantilist strategies advocated by Ducher to recover the balance of the American
debt:
Et  puisque  la  régénération  (du  peuple  français)  doit  reposer  sur  les  grands
principes,  puisque  ces  principes  condamnent  les  grandes  inégalités  de  fortune,
puisqu’on reconnaît dans les mœurs commerciales une cause de décadence, par la 
tiédeur qu’elles entraînent sur les dangers qui menacent la liberté; puisque nous
osons concevoir (et certes il le faut pour rester longtems libres) la paix universelle,
inséparable de la régénération universelle, à quoi serviroient les loix fiscales que
Ducher  prèche  dans  son  écrit?  Ignore‑t‑il  que  les  loix  prohibitives  de  nation  à
nation, constituent un état de rivalité et de guerre sourde, qui bientôt font courir
aux armes;  que  ces  loix  sont  toujours  corruptrices;  qu’elles  deviennent  bientôt,
pour les gens fins et habiles une sorte de privilèges à la suite desquels, naissent une
foule  d’abus, indépendamment  des  fortunes  scandaleuses  qu’ils  favorisent?
(Clavière 1793: 43)
28 Most notable in Clavière’s cri du cœur is its incoherence within the terms of the canonical
debate of mercantilism and laissez‑faire. The confusions between étatisme and liberalism,
the hesitations between a condemnation of inequalities based on the corruptive effects of
“les mœurs commerciales,”  and the critique of  protectionist  “loix prohibitives,”  that
create privileges and a “foule d’abus,” simultaneously reflect and crystallize the deeper
problem  of  formulating  a  coherent  revolutionary  economic  policy  in  the  Year  II  of
revolution.
29 Having put into place the assignats and the first Maximum that controlled wages and
prices in May 1793 a mere month before his arrest, Clavière was far removed from his
enlightened advocacy of free exchange among Atlantic trading partners, a position that
he had embraced only four years earlier. Having seen the Genêt mission fail to persuade
the United States to breach its neutrality in the European wars, Clavière would never
return to the ideal of the Société gallo‑américaine: a peaceful treaty that privileged private
commercial ties between the citizens of two free nations. At the same time, however,
protectionism, or “les loix prohibitives de nation à nation,” can only lead to war and are “
toujours corruptrices.” Clavière’s ideological transformation—while deeply contradictory
—was absolute.
30 By 1793, in the face of growing debt and war, Clavière and Ducher, americanophiles under
the Ancien Régime, witnessed republican transatlantic solidarity decline into a symbol of
geo‑political rivalry. The very subject of Atlantic commerce, no longer a unifying cause of
the advocates of “doux commerce,” had by the Year II become a lightly disguised veneer
for charges of corruption and abuse of public funds among revolutionaries in France.
What greater evidence of the impossibility of the “American Dream” for the Lumières than
its utter dissolution and collapse around the question of the French debt?
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31 On 8 March,  1795,  eight months after the beginning of Thermidor,  the United States
Congress passed a law with provisions to reimburse the remaining debt to France. The
closing  of  the  debate  over  the  French  debt,  however,  had  a  minimal  impact  on
Franco‑American trade relations, already severely damaged by the initial news of the
signing of  the  Jay  treaty  with England,  leaked out  in  early  1795.  By  early  1796,  the
Directory had sketched out various decrees and edicts threatening American commerce
in the West Indies over the Jay Treaty provisions. The United States and France were, by
this time, already hurtling toward the crisis atmosphere that would lead to the Quasi‑War
of 1798, that concluded only at the end of 1800, a period when French privateers attacked
and seized several hundreds of American ships in the Caribbean basin and outer Atlantic.
(Elkins & McKitrick 819, passim.)
32 The debate over the American debt illustrated the impossibility for the French during the
First Republic to reconceptualize trade relations between the two nations based upon the
changed moeurs and productive habits of “regenerated” republics. The Atlantic political
economy would not be recast by the higher ideals of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism or
republican  solidarities.  The  domestic  challenges  surrounding  the  French  deficit,  the
association of this deficit to the debt owed by the United States, and, finally, the uses of
the devastating charge of  corruption against  Clavière and other  Girondins,  as  well  as
previously  “Americanist”  advocates  of  closer  ties  between  the  two  nations  such  as
Mirabeau and Condorcet, doomed Franco‑American commercial ties as early as March
1787,  with Calonne’s  announcement  of  the decaying state  of  French finances.  In  the
aftermath of Calonne’s announcement, the inability of the discourse over commercial ties
between France and the United States to surpass the terms of the debt had prepared the
ideological grounds for the disillusionment, conflicts, and ultimately military hostilities
that characterized relations between the two “sister republics” at the very end of the
eighteenth century (Mirabeau, Condorcet).
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RÉSUMÉS
Les relations économiques entre les États‑Unis et la France étaient un enjeu majeur dans le « rêve
atlantique » des Lumières et des révolutionnaires français pendant les années 1780. L’espoir était
d’approfondir  les  relations  économiques  entre  les  deux  nations  « régénérées »  par  le
républicanisme d’outre‑atlantique d’une part, et par les réformes menées par la monarchie (pré
et post révolutionnaire) en France, d’autre part.
Cet  article  examine  un  facteur  négligé  dans  le  récit  classique  des  historiens,  celui  de
l’effondrement des liens idéologiques entre les deux nations à partir de 1787 en raison de la dette
américaine  envers  la  France  dans  le  contexte  de  la  prise  de  conscience  du  déficit  de  l’Etat
français. De l’annonce de Calonne de l’état catastrophique des finances de l’Etat français jusqu’à
« la guerre larvée » de 1798, la dette américaine a joué un rôle croissant dans les déceptions des
révolutionnaires français envers la « révolution atlantique ».
The economic relations between the United States and France were at the heart of the « Atlantic
Dream » of the Enlightenment and of many French Revolutionaries in the 1780s. On both sides of
the  Atlantic,  a  desire  to  deepen economic  ties  between the two « regenerated »  nations  was
kindled by the ideological potentials of republicanism in the United States and of the « reform
monarchy » at the end of the ancien régime and opening years of the Revolution.
This article examines an overlooked element in the « master narrative » of historians who have
focused on the degradation of the political  and economic ties between the two nations after
1787 : the American financial debt toward France grew in significance with the awareness of the
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proportions  of  the  deficit  of  the  French  state.  From  the  announcement  by  Calonne  of  the
catastrophic state of the French state’s finances until the « Quasi‑War » of 1798, the American
debt  played  a  growing  role  in  the  disillusionment  of  the  French  revolutionaries  toward  the
« Atlantic Revolution. »
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